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Abstract
In this working paper, my goal is to revisit Habermasian public sphere theory by first discussing its strengths and weaknesses in the context of today's (western European) television landscape. I then move on to exploring one reconceptualization of television as a public sphere, that of the Swedish scholar Peter Dahlgren (1995 Dahlgren ( & 2005 . Finally, I elaborate and further develop those key aspects of Dahlgren's model that I consider particularly relevant for rethinking the public sphere of today.
Public Sphere and Television Today
Television in its many senses -as a medium, an institution, an industry -has gone through fundamental changes in the past decade. These, in turn, have evoked numerous predictions and scenarios, from 'dumbing down' of television culture to the eventual 'death of television', inspired by the technology-oriented utopias of the Internet taking over as the key medium, and television merging with other forms of media. Still, TV remains as the most influential mass medium in Europe, alone if measured simply by the time people spend with it. In fact, there are great expectations for television as the key medium enhancing democracy and civic participation, expressed in the European Union policy statements as well as in national memoranda and reports on the topic.
Yet, for many media scholars as well as political scientists, Jürgen Habermas' theory of the public sphere may at the outset appear outdated when considering today's television landscapes in Europe or elsewhere. In his famous study The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (1989 Sphere ( /1962 , Habermas builds his model upon the development of the bourgeois society of the 17 th and 18 th century Europe. Based on that context, he suggests that a space was then formed and realised between the economy and polity where people could be informed and discuss, so as to form decisions and act upon them. The instruments of this sphere were newspapers, books, salons and debating societies that allowed an arena relatively separate of the Church and the State, characterised by openness to all citizens, in the sense of the 18 th century. As follows, he sees such a communicative forum as a model for a public sphere that facilitates rational-critical debate amongst citizens, that accordingly ensures political will formation, and that is therefore crucial for democracy.
In contrast, the present context, with technological advances such as digitalisation, coupled with debates on globalisation as well as on cultural, economic and political neoliberal tendencies might point towards other approaches in understanding television's role in the society. To be sure, much of postmodern theorisation of popular culture in the 1990s would suggest alternative outlooks. Also, Habermas himself considered the public sphere already at the time of the publishing of his study to be 'refeudalised'. He viewed the mass media's role as a public sphere dubious, as they give in to commercial imperatives and address their viewers as consumers. His scepticism is illustrated by the following quotes:
"Mass culture has earned its rather dubious name precisely by achieving increased sales by adapting to the need for relaxation and entertainment on the part of consumer strata with relatively little education, rather than through the guidance of an enlarged public toward the appreciation of a culture undamaged in its substance." (Habermas 1962 (Habermas /1989 "The world fashioned by the mass media is a public sphere in appearance only.
By the same token the integrity of the private sphere which they promise to their consumers is also an illusion." (Habermas 1962 (Habermas /1989 Yet, as the above citations illustrate, his argumentation seems to share features with the public debate that surrounds at least European television today. These arguments address the concern for contents geared towards entertainment for commercial reasons, for the positioning of viewers as indulging consumers rather than rational-critical citizens, for the diminishing political participation and, as the end result of these tendencies, for the crisis of democracy.
The resonance and relevance of the Habermasian idea of the public sphere can also be said to manifest in the vast amount theorising and application it has inspired. Alone the amount of revising and criticism emphasises the importance of this thought. Different points of dissatisfaction include the claim that Habermas idealizes the bourgeois public sphere and its thrive for public enlightenment while neglecting other, 'plebeian' public spheres. It has also been said that he exaggerates the idea of 'refeudalisation' and the manipulative powers of culture industries in the mass media era. Yet another critique is that Habermas emphasises rational consensus rather than the continuing need for compromise of differing interests, and for a pluralist public sphere. Thus, it has been claimed, he dismisses communication that is not geared toward consensus and accordingly, creates too great of a boundary between information and entertainment.
Despite of the doubts presented about the public sphere idea, Habermas' work has influenced many disciplines and debates ranging from the democratic theory of political science, the self-reflection of cultural critics, the modernism/postmodernism debate, to empirical studies in sociology and communications. Specifically, as Peter Dahlgren (2005, 411-12) notes, the role of television has explicitly or implicitly been framed in the public sphere thematic also in countless recent analyses, whether they concern new genres such as those that fall under the term of reality television, whether they address globalisation of national television culture, or whether they seek to tackle the evolution of broadcasting journalism. The public sphere has proven useful both as an analytical concept but also as normative ideal -and, as Dahlgren (op cit.) points out, it has in the course of years left the strict Frankfurt School theory realm and is now often used more generically to refer to democratic goals and responsibilities of the media and the civic life.
It is in the spirit of the latter definition that Peter Dahlgren (2004) writes about the role of theory as 'intellectual scaffolding':
" [Theory] serves to orient us, to pull together sets of facts and assumptions, and offers normative dispositions. It helps to provide significance to what we observe, and to suggest the various types of action or intervention. In this sense, there may not always be demarcated distinctions between formalized theory and the more general (and less systematic) thought modes we use." (Dahlgren 2004, 11.) Still, in this paper I do not advocate on the notion of the public sphere solely as a vague set of expectations for the media in democratic societies, but wish to sharpen the idea with the help of existing criticism as well as specify it regarding television. The thematic of the public sphere, I argue, benefits from the various further theorizations and coupled with them, may further understanding of the phenomenon of television of the past decades as well as today. The main features of the Habermasian public sphere that call for revision today, are therefore discussed below.
Normative Sphere Revisited
First, in the most fundamental level, most critics seem to agree that Habermas' model is too normative as it celebrates the 18 th century liberal world. In the realm of theorisation on democracy, it could be interpreted that the existence of a public sphere in the 20 th century social-welfare mass democracy is virtually impossible. Habermas, then, sees little potential with today's mass media that are not only distorted by commercial imperatives to entertain, but that also reduce to a minimum the 'distance that required the privacy of appropriation as much as it made possible the publicity of a rational-critical exchange' (1996, 170) .
Regardless, there is no question about the fundamental role that is given to the notion of the public sphere when defining the media's role in the society. In this context, radio and television -and beginning of the new millennium also new media such as the Internetcannot be dismissed. The latter meaning has been widely discussed in relation to the media, both by political scientists and cultural studies scholars in relation to the media, as it seems that the conventions regarding these attributes are rapidly and continuously changing (a summary account of the discussions is provided by, e.g., Dahlgren 2005, 419 This critique, reflecting a strand of academic work that flourished in the last decade, can be elaborated by paying attention to the emergence of new kind of civic activism, for instance in the form of loose networks and single-issue movements (Dahlgren 2005, 413) . The idea of a public sphere, provided by one medium (or even by several media in unison), fostering one kind of civic culture, is clearly outdated alone because of the factual reality of ever fragmenting media audiences, of different kinds of contents within one medium and different needs to follow different kinds of contents, and of the different uses of old and new media. So while for example television is not dead, it
certainly cannot be said to cater for the public sphere, for everyone simultaneously.
Public Sphere and Public Service
There is a clear connection between the public sphere theorization and public service broadcasting. On one hand, this is a paradox, as Habermas' model seems to advocate a neutral sphere that defies both the corporate and state control. From a slightly different angle, one of the model's strengths can be found precisely in that it escapes the trap of the traditional opposition of free markets versus state-governed media. On the other hand, the normative nature of the model seems to translate well into media policy practices and debates and to adjust to the mission of public service broadcasting (See account of discussion, e.g., in Collins 2002).
Undeniably, Habermas has been used to discuss the public service broadcasting mission and for its defence, against deregulatory and commercialising tendencies in practice.
Concerning European media policies, a persistent (if latent) sense of the need to construct a public sphere has guided many public service media organisations (e.g., Similar vain of thought has also been expressed regarding globalizing media markets:
Rich media seems to result in poor democracy (e.g., McChesney 1999).
Controversy and the Political
When controversial issues regarding media contents such as 'trash television' or 'entertainization of TV culture' are addressed in the academic and/or public discussion, they are often presented together with the above mentioned trends. For this reason I argue that in addressing popular media culture, the public sphere paradigm and the post modern cultural theory have meetings points in searching for articulations of the political. Or, as Kevin Glynn explains his motivation to study tabloid culture:
"Wherever the cultural tastes and practices of some people disgust and offend others, there can be little doubt that we are in the presence of the political… The production of disgust, offence, and popular pleasures is of primary significance for cultural theory because it is central to the general process whereby the meanings we make ourselves and of the social world are organised and reorganised. This process has crucial implications for social change, not least because it shapes the production, diffusion and urgency of the recognition of a need for change." (Glynn 2000, 9.) In other words, if politics is about different (social) interests for which solutions are sought, the public sphere paradigm and the (some forms of) cultural theory seem to agree in the basic assumptions and goals. In this light, it could be argued that the public sphere constructed by debate and discussion is not necessarily oppositional to discursively constructed realities, a stand point advocated in post-modern theorisation.
As Fraser (1991) argues, Habermas' public sphere can be seen as:
" [A] theatre in modern societies in which political participation is enacted through the medium of talk … a space in which citizens deliberate their common affairs, and hence an institutionalised arena of discursive interaction" (110).
Thus, it is symptomatic that the public sphere framework has been recognized and even utilised alongside the cultural studies oriented readings on tabloid television and tabloid journalism in general (e.g., Dahlgren & Sparks 1992 , Langer 1999 , Livingstone & Lunt 1994 , Sparks & Tulloch 2000 .
In sum, the thematic of the public sphere as theoretical inspiration or scaffolding for understanding today's television is relevant for several reasons. First, the academic and public debate on changes in the television landscape can traced to the public sphere ideal.
I argue that the public sphere model is an interesting starting point especially when examining European television systems that are based on a strong public service and hence public sphere ethos, but relevant also in any case with nation-bound television.
Lastly, Habermas' model provides not only a theory but a normative stand. Sonia Livingstone and Peter Lunt (1994) who have used the public sphere paradigm when examining a form of tabloid television, that of talk shows, aptly articulate the promise that just may have caused Habermas' appeal to a variety of theoretical and empirical applications in the past decades:
"Habermas' position reflects the ambivalence felt by many towards the mass media -that there is a great power, but can it be harnessed for the public good?
We suggest that pessimistic answers tend to underestimate the complex and contradictory or fragmented nature of the contemporary mass media which opens the way for some escape from institutional control, while more optimistic positions often set too high ideals for the public sphere. Those alternative formulations of the public sphere which recognize and build on the complex and fragmentary nature of the media suggest more positively that the media could facilitate and legitimize the public negotiation -through compromise rather than convergence between television as we know it and other media, but even more importantly, he argues for integration of television and other forms of media culture. He also brings forth the idea of multiple public spheres and emphasizes the increasingly blurring boundaries of the public and the private. He recognizes the importance of popular culture in television and advocates utilization and combination of the 'culturalists' (Dahlgren's term for cultural studies oriented) perspectives with the more traditional social sciences oriented views to the thematics television and the public sphere; this is a parallel to his ideas of interlinking political science, public sphere and culturalist approaches (Dahlgren 2004 ).
However, Dahlgren's (2005) most interesting elaboration -at least regarding the linkage between empirical analyses and a broader perspective of the relevance on television culture -is that instead of concentrating on citizenship (as in 1995) he stresses the notion of civic cultures. He re-emphasises the fact that television's role is not only to provide a sphere for expressing such cultures, but also in pre-structuring them. He also lays out a conceptual model of five dimensions of civic cultures: (1) knowledge and competence,
values; (3) affinity and trust; (4) practices; and (5) identities. They can, according to Dahlgren, be seen 'as integrated circuits with five mutually reciprocal dimensions' and that can be taken 'as starting points for empirical inquiry about the media's significance for civic cultures, and (…) on the role of television' (Dahlgren 2005, 424) .
The Four Dimensions of the Public Sphere
Dahlgren (1995, (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) defines the four basic dimensions of the public sphere as follows (see also Figure 1 ): 1) Social structures. Dahlgren formulates this category constituting of institutional arrangements of society, including social stratification, power alignments, and the state. Thus, it entails political, economic and legal aspects, as well as, for instance, the nature and quality of educational system. Dahlgren admits that this dimension is potentially so broad that at some point of the analysis it must 'be put in brackets', in order to be able to remain the focus in the public sphere (op cit. 12).
However, he strongly emphasises Habermas' point of the public sphere as historical, connected to and constructed by larger social figurations. Therefore, although social structures can be said to constitute and condition the other aspects of the public sphere -in his words, institutions, interaction and representations -it is important to recognize this overall dimension. In this context, Dahlgren raises an issue that reflects to the complex conditions of today's societies and that he calls 'the tension between the whole and the parts' 3) Sociocultural interaction. This dimension 'refers to non-mediated face-to-face encounters between citizens, to relevant aspects of subjectivity and identity processes and to the interface of media and citizens' (op cit. 12). Dahlgren sees the last point, that is, processes related to media reception, being often the first step of interaction and notes:
"[T]he public sphere is not just a 'marketplace of ideas' or an 'information exchange depot', but also a major societal mechanism for the production and circulation of culture, which frames and gives meaning to our identities." (1995, 23 The internal dynamics between the various dimensions of this public sphere model, although not explicitly discussed by Dahlgren (1995) , are sketched in figure 1. The figure is intended to illustrate the encompassing nature of social structures that shape institutions, social interaction as well as contents. This is surely a two-way dynamics, but the 'feedback' from the three is not as overt or pronounced. With the figure, I also suggest the self-evident notion that media contents are central to the idea of television as a public sphere. Similarly, as darker and lighter arrows indicate, institutional setting (e.g., whether a broadcaster is a public service or commercial one) tends to influence, in general terms, contents more strongly than vice versa. The dynamics between media contents and social interaction should and could ultimately be free flowing, media output fostering interaction and interaction feeding into media contents. The basic 'dumbing down' argument seems to insinuate that this relationship does not work sufficiently well from the contents to interaction and thus democracy is not fostered; and the critique of the public sphere model reminds us of the fact that the opposite flow is often very homogenous, that is, the multitude of possible voices are not reflected in the contents. In this context, Bauman addresses the media, television in particular and claims that the public space or sphere (terms used in his work synonymously) is becoming empty. This is not an original idea as such but seems to be in line with the main strand of the tabloidization discussion. However, Bauman (2000, 70) argues that this shift is not abstractly caused by the Zeitgeist of the times, but is a result of a fundamental transformation of the public sphere. He gives it a new provocative definition: 'public space is where public confession of private secrets and intimacies is made' (op cit., 40).
Yet, he does not remain with the criticism of consumerism and entertainment-orientation. Bauman sees a more fundamental meaning in the lightening of media output.
He claims that the question is not about the ever shifting boundary between what is
private and what is public, but that in the public sphere, citizenship-based politics have been replaced with public display of private affairs. The media, then, do not act accordingly only out of, for instance, commercial imperative to entertain, but they, television in particular, feed into a specific need of the liquid society. The media provide individual solutions to shared problems: they create momentary spectacles so that people can pretend they belong, and that they can see how other lonely individuals cope with individual problems of life politics:
"Each day the first-page press and first-minute TV headlines wave a new banner under which to gather and march (virtual) shoulder to (virtual) shoulder. They offer a virtual 'common purpose' around which virtual communities may entwine … [T]hey effectively ward off the condensation of 'genuine' (that is, comprehensive and ever lasting) communities which they mime …They scatter instead of condense the untapped energy of sociality impulses and so contribute to the perpetuation of the solitude…" (op cit., 201).
In addition to the strong criticism on the media of the 'liquid modernity', Bauman also has a solution in the form of a strong view on the notion of the public sphere. In his view, the societies defined by the 'unholy trinity' of uncertainty, insecurity and unsafety require joint action and some forms of consensus (even at a global level) instead of individual discursive identity construction and private resistance of the power-block through consumption:
"Any true liberation calls today for more, not less, of the public sphere and public power. It is now the public sphere which badly needs defence against the invading private -though, paradoxically, in order to enhance, not cut down, (Dahlgren 1995, 53-54) .
Public and Other Spheres
Yet another consequence of emphasising the fluid nature of modernity helps to set boundaries to the public sphere as an analytical concept and to position Dahlgren's fourdimensional model of television as a public sphere in relation to other spheres in the society. By acknowledging the possibility of fluid modernity, one acknowledges rapidly changing structures the current societies and the fluidity of various boundaries. For this purpose, I find Thomas Janoski's (1998, 13) model of four societal spheres -the state sphere, public sphere, market sphere and private sphere -useful. In his model, the state sphere includes the executive and juridiciary powers, bureaucracy, as well as the police, military, and the like. The market sphere consists of different markets, and firms operating in those markets, as well as labour unions influencing the sphere. The private sphere is that of family and friends, of intimate relationships.
Janoski's (1998) understanding of the public sphere, then entails voluntary associations, social movements, self-help groups, education and health care -as well as, essentially, the media. However, he emphasises the fact that the borders between the spheres are by no means fixed and strict, but that the spheres overlap. Accordingly, he positions television not only as a component of the 'pure' public sphere. One overlapping area is between the public and state spheres, in the realm in which he also positions political parties and which for him is the realm of public service broadcasting. The other area where television is present is situated in the meeting of the public and the private spheres: this occurs when people's private lives disclosed in the media.
Janoski (1998, (13) (14) himself recognizes the much discussed blurring boundaries of the public and the private spheres and states that increasingly in modern times, the state, market, and the public spheres have invaded the private sphere. Another increasingly fluid border or overlap could be seen between the market, the state and the public sphere, as the economization, or the distance between the economical and the political have been said to diminish if not vanish (e.g., Preston 2001 ). In addition, many scholars who address the so called marketization of the media would most likely like to place for instance much of today's television in an intersection of public and market spheres. Also, while Janoski's nation-based model is relevant to the examination of television with a nation-wide focus, internationalisation and globalisation tendencies influence the spheres.
Indeed, it has been argued that globalized media markets have already emerged full force, and the medium most affected is television; both regarding ownership as well as contents (McChesney 1999, 78-80) . With these alterations in mind, I argue that Janoski's conceptualisation of the location of the public sphere helps to understand the dynamics and overlaps between various societal spheres.
Television in the Era of Availability and Plenty
The final additional emphasis regarding fluidity concerns a changing characteristic of television as a medium. As Dahlgren (2000) Ellis (op cit., 72) argues that in the times of fragmented audiences and increasing choice of television contents, this medium can provide people with a process of 'working through' the complex nature of our liquid societies. He refers to Bauman, yet takes a more positive stand than the latter, in emphasising television's importance to the Age of Uncertainty:
old tolerance is not enough between differing beliefs and the lifestyles that accompany them. What is needed is 'sympathy', and sympathy is the product of television's process of working through. By placing explanations, rearranging the facts, looking from all possible angles, using the different emotional registers of its different genres, television is able to provide sympathy across the process of differentiation that is modern consumer society." (Op cit., 85)
The relevance of Ellis' thinking to the public sphere model used here is that television is taking increasingly different institutional forms, providing more contents with new technologies, potentially involving diverse social structures and social interaction in diverse ways in different situations -thus contributing to its fluidity as a public sphere.
By the same token, as Ellis notes, the working through is an open-ended process without a conclusion, but television's power is in its ability to provide for different sense-making processes that contribute to understanding of the uncertain times of liquid modernity. Dahlgren (2005, 417-419) , too, recognizes Ellis' orientation as important in theorizing television and the public sphere, and suggests three expansions to it, mirroring the idea of fluidity: First, he notes that there are multiple trajectories such as class, gender, ethnicity, but also technology as well as local, national and global settings -and they all shape working through in complex and contradictory, un-fixed ways. Second, working through is different for different kinds of groups, and thus television's 'hegemony is loose, leaky and always at risk' (418). Third, Dahlgren wants to emphasise that Ellis' approach is not polarized between affective and rational -in other words, working through could be said to be a fluid process between the two.
In sum, to include definitions of historical specificity that emphasise the fluid nature of television as a public sphere to Dahlgren's model, I want to 1) frame it within today's (western) world as fluid modernity, 2) locate it in shifting, overlapping relations with other societal spheres, and 3) recognise that television as a medium has entered the Era of Plenty that may contribute to the model of television as a public sphere that is changing -not towards a specific direction, but fluidly.
Plurality, Viewers' Positions and Civic Cultures
The second specifying concept to Dahlgren's (1995) model of the public sphere, plurality, is indeed recognised by him. Yet, I discuss the concept further, as it is at the core of Dahlgren's reworking of the public sphere thematic (2005), and as it has been widely discussed in relation to the classic Habermasian public sphere in many contexts. I find it paramount to overcome the dual definition of the position of the viewer as viewercitizen (as it is central in the original Habermasian public sphere framework) and the viewer-consumer (as the view is emphasised by the postmodern cultural theory-based of research) (e.g., Livingstone & Lunt 1994, 18-19) . This, in turn, leads to the fundamental re-definition of the public sphere idea as containing plurality in itself, and specifically, to the view that television, in Dahlgren's (2005) terms, fosters civic cultures -in plural.
At the outset, based on my reading of Dahlgren's (1995) This means that viewers seem to form all smaller subgroups or, in business terms, 'audience segments', or the viewers divide as audiences of certain few genres. Also, an audience consisting of a group of viewers is not synonymous to a public. In contrast to the term 'public' as accessible to all, used for instance in the case of public service broadcasting, Habermas (1962 Habermas ( /1989 notes that the most commonly used meaning of 'the public' refers to the public carrier of public opinion as a 'critical judge' to counter official powers. Admittedly, public service broadcasting ethos often seems to imply that the condition of an institution being 'public' best serves the formation of 'a public' of 'the public'. Based on Dahlgren's (1995) theorizing, I see the concept of 'a public' as a 'critical judge' as a potential, neither a normative ideal nor a descriptive analytical tool.
Furthermore, the concept of television viewers as citizens has undeniably been at the core in thinking inspired by the public sphere paradigm. The citizen entails the modernist idea of 'passive and active membership of individuals in a nation-state with certain rights and obligations' (Janoski 1998, 9) . In contrast, as already mentioned, (postmodernist) cultural theory has often been considered to address the viewer as a consumer, if an actively resistant and reflective one. Toby Miller (1999, 282) states, somewhat ironically, that when discussing television, there still exists a complicated relationship between citizen and consumer, 'even though the citizen is a wizened figure from the past and the consumer is a naïve phenomenon, essentially a creature of the nineteenth century'.
However, Dahlgren's model (1995 Dahlgren's model ( , 2005 Surely, as Preston (2001) emphasizes, the above are abstract analytical categories that will be combined in many 'discursive accounts and practices'. But exactly as such they highlight that in the blurring world of the public and the private, citizenship is perhaps no longer the sole sufficient concept, even when theorization stems from the public sphere tradition. Plurality is at stake here, too. Also, television viewers do not engage a systematic and static use of television as a public sphere, and while the critical-rational citizen may be the key participant in a democracy, it may not be the only or the 'pure' position for participating in a public sphere. For example Ellis (2000) uses the concept of witness; and in my view his idea implies that shared witnessing and 'working through' with television may be a part of a public sphere, alongside with more active and explicitly rational debate and opinion formation. and groups when they act as citizens (Dahlgren 2005, 423) .
In further mapping such resources and television's role in enhancing the resources, Dahlgren (2005, 424-430) 3) Affinity and trust. In Dahlgren's words, affinity and trust point out to the need for 'a minimal sense of commonality among citizens in heterogeneous late modern societies'.
4)
Practices. This circuit deals with the notion that a democracy is built on and functions because of certain practices, discussion and rational decision-making being the traditional practices connected to the public sphere ideal. Dahlgren extends this circuit also to entail, e.g., practices of television viewing -that may be said to relate to individual control and empowerment.
5)
Identities. This circuit is explicitly concerned with the identity formation of the viewers, and the ways they are addressed. While citizen is not the only identity, it is still needed to foster a democracy. Thus, citizenship in turn still needs to be fostered for example by the media.
To condense the model, Dahlgren's (2005) five dimensions of civic cultures, although thematically distinct, clearly intertwine. Each of them can be supported, renewed and reworked in a mediated public sphere, and they, in turn, provide resources for citizenship. Television as a 'Platform' for Plural Public Spheres
The final emphasis I wish to add to Dahlgren's model stands close to the discussion of the position of the viewer, namely the possible plurality of spheres. This is often seen to emerge regarding forms of and communicative modes offered by popular culture, for example tabloid television. Based on their work on talk shows, Livingstone and Lunt (1994) argue that the elitist, state-governed broadcasting as well as the market-driven commercial broadcasting both disregard the participatory aspect but, in concrete terms, Livingstone & Lunt (1994, 94-95) have articulated as follows:
Habermas proposes for the institutional development of a critical voice within the lifeworld so as to produce a consensual and reasoned challenge to established power, whereas proponenets of the oppositional public sphere, often drawing from the cultural studies tradition, view institution as a context for diverse voices with different power bases. My reading of Dahlgren's (1995 Dahlgren's ( , 2005 theorization makes it possible to consider that in this framework, amongst other components of a public sphere, television provides a particular platform for multiple spheres. What positions they take and in which kind of sense-making, consuming or will-formation processes they engage is not only their choice as individuals forming active audiences.
What is left from the original Habermasian public sphere concept, if I recognize the fluidity, plurality and heterogeneity as well as the limited potential of television as a public sphere? Again, by emphasizing the possibility of multiple, plural and changing public spheres, I do not mean to, for example, transform the public sphere framework into some 'poststructurally inflected version of hegemony theory' -as Glynn (2000) notes when critically assessing Livingstone & Lunt's (1994) revisionist terms of 'proletarian'
and 'oppositional' public spheres in relation to tabloid television. What I have sought to stress is that change is not ahistorical, that nation-state bound, public service oriented broadcasting is still alive in Europe, but that the current social context also has elements of fluidity and plurality.
The possible existence of multiple public spheres is not a novelty but has been given importance when theorizing politics in relation to formation of 'new communities' and the new media (e.g., Preston 2001, 208-209,) . They form a plural and decentered public sphere constituted not by total identification as in the traditional community -for example, that of a nation-state -but rather by conflict, combining notions of interest and identity. It is characterized by the overlapping of an array of institutions and practical formations, including informal movements and associations where solidarities are formed, as well as formal governmental and legal institutions. Next to techno-utopian visions, it has namely been questioned if people's ability to create their own Net-based communities actually allows them to ignore other communities and 'bypass any contact with the balance of society' (McChesney 1999, 146 
